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APPLICABLE LAW

The consideration for the issuance of shares may
be paid, in whole or in part, in money, in other
property, tangible or intangible, or in labor or
services actually performed for the corporation. When
payment of the consideration for which shares are to be
issued shall have been received by the corporation,
such shares shall be deemed to be fully paid and nonassessable.

2
Neither promissory
constitute payment
a corporation.

notes nor future
or part payment,

services shall
for shares of

In the absence of fraud in the transaction, judgment of
the board of directors or shareholders, as the case may
be, as to the value of the consideration received for
shares shall be conclusive.
Section 16-10-18, U.C.A. 1953.
The initial bylaws of a corporation shall be adopted by
its board of directors.
The power to alter, amend or
repeal the bylaws or adopt new bylaws, subject to
repeal or change by action of the shareholders shall be
vested in the boards of directors unless reserved to
the shareholders by the articles of incorporation. No
bylaws shall be adopted by the directors which shall
require more than a majority of the voting shares for
a quorum at a meeting of shareholders, or more than a
majority of the votes cast to constitute action by the
shareholders, except where higher
percentages are
required by law or by the articles of incorporation.
The
bylaws
may
contain any provisions for the
regulation and management of the affairs
of the
corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles
of incorporation.
Section 16-19-25, U.C.A 1953.
(b) Any person who is a shareholder of record, upon
written demand stating the purpose thereof, shall have
the right to examine, in person, or by agent or
attorney, at any reasonable time or times, for any
proper purpose, its books and records of account,
minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts
therefrom. A proper purpose means a purpose reasonably
related to the person's interest as a shareholder.
(c)
Any officer or agent who, or a corporation
which, shall refuse to allow any such shareholder, or
his agent or attorney, so to examine and make extracts
from its books and records of account, minutes, and
record of shareholders, for any proper purpose, shall
be liable to such shareholder in a penalty of 10% of
the value of the shares owned by such shareholder, in
addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by
law; but no such penalty shall exceed $5,000.
Section 16-10-47(b)(c) (U.C.A. - Supplement 1985)

3
(c)
Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing
affidavits.
The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue
as to
any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. Except as provided in
subdivision (a) hereof and subdivision (b)(1) of Rule
55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge and
filed with the clerk.
(c)
When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of
Actions and Judgment Docket.
A judgment is complete and
shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the
creation of a lien on real preoprty, when the same is signed
and filed as herein above provided.
The clerk shall
immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register
of actions and the judgment docket.
Rule 58A(b)(c) U.R.C.P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A-l Tank

Rental & Brine Service,

June 28, 1976. The incorporators were

Inc. was incorporated on
Robert H. Williams, Lloyd

LaDell Slaugh, Mark H. McKee, Ted McBride and Dan H. McKee.
of the individuals were employed with

Dalbo, Inc.,

corporation.

family

Mr. Williams

Dalbo and the other
This group

and

his

incorporators were

All

another Utah

were the owners of

key employees

of Dalbo.

of individuals had decided that a related corporation

providing rental of tanks, etc., could

be profitable.

This new

4
business

was

closely

provided brine service

related

to

in

oil

the

the business of Dalbo, which
fields

around Northwestern

Utah.
At the

time of

the attorney for the
Bylaws

are

part

of

the incorporation,
corporation,
the

Bylaws were prepared by

Attorney

John

Beaslin.

The

trial record at 22-36 and Brief.

The

Bylaws provided in relevant part:
It is hereby agreed by and between the five
principal stockholders that all of the stockholders
will remain as employees of Dalbo, Inc. for a period of
three (3) years commencing October 1, 1975, in order to
retain their stock positions in this corporation. If
any of the*stockholders leave the employment of Dalbo,
Inc. before the end of the three-year period, then each
of the parties shall receive a return of their investment plus interest at the rate of Ten percent (10%) per
annum from the time of contribution, which was October
1, 1975.
Lloyd LaDell Slaugh, Mark
McBride

each

contributed

H. McKee, Dan
the

sum

of

H. McKee

and Ted

$11,877.50

to

the

corporation. Williams contributed a brine plant which was agreed
to

be

attributable

The stock was divided

to

51%

of

the assets of the corporation.

12.25% each

to Lloyd

H. McKee, Dan H. McKee and Ted McBride.
51% of the stock.

LaDell Slaugh, Mark

Robert Williams received

The bylaws were prepared for signature by each

of the parties, however it is undisputed that the bylaws were not
signed.

However, it is also undisputed before the court that the

Bylaws were

agreed to by all of the stockholders.

See Affidavit

of Lloyd LaDell Slaugh and Mark H. McKee, paragraph

3, 4

Trial Record at 67-69 and Appendix to Brief. It

also undis-

puted

that

the

Plaintiff

Dan

H. McKee

is

voluntarily

and 5,

left the

5
employment of

Dalbo, Inc., before the completion of three years.

Prior to that permanent termination, he
tary

leave

of

absence

for

several

had also

taken a volun-

months.

Id at paragraph

Thereafter, the Plaintiff received back his
$11,877.50, together

with interest

at the rate of 10% per annum

from the date of his monetary contribution to
Brine Service

pursuant to

contribution of

the bylaws. Id.

A-1 Tank

Rental &

There is no evidence

that the Plaintiff ever requested a stock certificate be given to
him or

in any

prior to

way acted

institution

approximately

of

three

or purported
the

to act

litigation

(3) years

from

as a stockholder

herein,

the

date

a
he

period of
left

the

corporation.
On January 4, 1982, Plaintiff filed
was

a

stockholder

in

the

suit alleging

Defendant A-1 Tank Rental and Brine

Service, Inc. and that the Defendants were refusing to
a

stock

certificate

for

the

requested monetary relief for
had engaged

in which

that he

shares

he owed.

activities

which

issue him

Plaintiff also
the corporation

would violate his rights as a stockholder,

were he determined to be a stockholder.
The Defendants appeared and
that

Plaintiff

was

a

answered the

stockholder

in

the

Answer specifically noted that the bylaws
agreed to

Complaint denying
corporation.

were drafted

that

and were

and that based thereon Plaintiff was not a stockholder

as he had failed to work the requisite time. The
noted

The

the

Plaintiff

had

received

the

Answer further
return

of

his

6
investment

together

with

interest

at

10% pursuant

to

the

stockholder agreement.
After some minimal discovery,
for Partial

Summary Judgment

Defendants were attempting to
asking for

determination that

the Plaintiff

alleging that
forfeit his

filed a Motion

the corporation and
stock certificate and

he was a stockholder. The Defend-

ants responded asking the court to deny Plaintiff's Motion and at
that time

filed the

Affidavit of

H. McKee previously referred to,
the Appendix.

Prior to

Lloyd LaDell
a copy

of which

is located in

this time, Robert H. Williams had also

answered Plaintiff's Interrogatories.
and Appendix to Brief.

Slaugh and Mark

See Trial Record

at 48-51

In relevant part, that answer to interro-

gatories was as follows:
1. Attached to the Defendants1 Answer was a set of
alleged Bylaws of the corporation. However, those Bylaws
were not signed. Please state whether the Plaintiff ever
signed those Bylaws, and if so the date and also state
whether any of the other Defendants signed the Bylaws and if
so the date. If the Bylaws have been adopted, please state
the date of the meeting at which they were adopted, the
place of the meeting and all parties present and the vote
that was taken in adopting the Bylaws.
ANSWER: Plaintiff did not sign the Bylaws attached to
the Defendants1 Answer but they were prepared and discussed
by all of the shareholders in the corporation and agreed to
by them even though not signed. The Bylaws apparently were
not formally adopted by the Board but were in the possession
of the corporation shortly after organized.
Thus, at

the time of making the decision on the Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the court had

the Complaint

and Answer,

Answers to Interrogatories, a copy of the Bylaws and

Articles of

Incorporation

Slaugh

Mark

and

and

H. McKee.

the
Judge

Affidavit
Ballif

of

denied

Lloyd LaDell
the

Motion

7
for Summary

Judgment in

Minute Entry

on

Trial

Thereafter, Plaintiff

a ruling
Record

at

84

and

for

Summary

80-83 and Appendix to Brief.

Appendix

conclusion.
Judgment

and realleging

approximately

Motion for

three

Motion for

the Motion

months

for Summary

later, Judge Ballif
of procedure

do not

Reconsider but because the case would be

transferred to a Judge in the
rescind its

of the

that the denial was the correct

entered a new ruling stating that the rules
recognize a

See Trial

The Defendants responded

Subsequent to the denial of

and

to Brief.

Judgment.

asking the court not to reconsider the denial
Summary Judgment

14, 1982. See

made Motion to the court to reconsider its

denial of Plaintiff's Motion
Record at

dated October

Seventh District,

the court would

denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment, referring

the matter to

Judge

Davidson

for

his

reconsideration.

Trial

Record at 85 and Appendix to Brief.
It

should

be

noted

that

transferred to Judge Davidson
Motion

for

Reconsideration

by
had

the

in

fact

the

December
been

matter

matter

6,

1982, after the

made.

back

to

had been

Evidently, Judge

Davidson then

referred

rescinded his

ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment and then

the matter was again referred back to Judge

Judge

Davidson.

Ballif who

See Trial

Record at 89.
The

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

was then resubmitted to

Judge Davidson with the same affidavits

and legal memorandum as

had

Ballif.

previously

considering

been

those

given

entered

to
its

Judge

Memorandum

The court after

Decision

granting

8
Partial Summary

Judgment to

the Plaintiff.

Trial Record at 109

and 110 and Appendix to Brief.

The court

the fact

not been signed and that while no

that the

Bylaws had

based its

decision on

stock had been issued, Plaintiff was entitled to the issuance and
therefore he

was a

court found the
thereafter

stockholder.

issue

could

to

be

forfeit

the authority

was given

law that

May 26,

not

the corporation

forfeiture of

The court

stock unless

authority,

the

court

ruled

as a

remained a stockholder in the

This Memorandum Decision was

rendered on

1983. An Order implementing the Memorandum Decision was

signed on June
and Appendix

15, 1983.
to Brief.

See

Trial

to

the

Record

at

121

and 122

On July 13, 1983, the Defendants filed a

Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
respect

or

in the corporate charter or by statute.

the Plaintiff

Defendant corporation.

that determination, the

stockholder interest.

work a

There being no claim of such
matter of

whether

his

found that a Bylaw could not

Given

Partial

with

Summary

the

Judgment

Supreme

Court with

previously granted.

See Trial Record at 127-29.
Shortly before that effort
the Plaintiff

to obtain

interlocutory relief,

mailed a letter to Defendant's Attorney dated June

30, 1983 requesting documents be provided by July
Trial

Record

at

124-25

and

Appendix

to Brief.

15, 1983. See
The Petition

for Interlocutory Appeal was denied on August 2, 1983.
On February 3, 1984, Judge Davidson entered an
Defendants requiring

them to

appear on

a.m. to show cause why they should not be

Order to the

March 27, 1984 at 10:00
found in

contempt for

9
their failure

to create

Plaintiff pursuant to
entered.

and deliver

the

Partial

a stock certificate to the
Summary

Judgment previously

See Trial Record at 180.

On March 27, 1984, the Defendants and their counsel appeared
and indicated a willingness to provide
file a

the stock

certificate or

Supercedeas Bond if the court would enter it's Order as a

Judgment so that

Defendants

Supercedeas Bond.

would

the

right

to

file a

See Trial Record at 202. The court indicated

that it was not required to

docket its

before requiring, the Defendants
certificate to Plaintiff.
they had

have

the right

Partial Summary Judgment

to create and deliver the stock

The Defendants resisted,

arguing that

to post a Supercedeas Bond prior to delivery

of the stock certificate and that they were entitled to a hearing
on

such

prior

to

delivery

and further that the court had not

docketed the judgment so as to allow them to obtain a Supercedeas
Bond with respect to the stock certificate.
The court

indicated that

if the stock certificate were not

delivered to the Plaintiff by the

next morning,

would be imprisoned in the Uintah County Jail.
further discussion,
that the

the court

stock certificate

changed it's

would not

until a final decision was made in this
Based

on

that

delivered by
ceeded

to

agreement,

a

the Defendants

enter

a

judgment

that Defendants

Thereafter, after

position and agreed

be given to the Plaintiff
case, including appeals.

stock certificate was immediately

to the

court, the

against

court then pro-

the Defendants for civil

contempt in the amount of $671.50 and $22.50 as and for attorneys

10
fees incurred in the matter.
On

May

include a

29,

1984

derivative

Defendants.

the

cause

Defendants

See Trial Record at 204 - 206.
Plaintiff
of

action

entered

an

plaint denying specifically that
under the

amended its Complaint to
against

the individual

Answer to the Amended Com-

a derivative

action was proper

because the

only other stock-

circumstances involved

holder other than the Defendants was

the Plaintiff

and that the

prerequisites for derivative action had been completed.
The Amended
causes of action*
was entitled

Complaint requested
The first cause

to 10% of the

relief on

of action

value of

a number of new

was that Plaintiff

the shares

owned by each

shareholder, including attorneys fees, costs and damages pursuant
to Utah

Code Annotated,

action was for dissolution

Section 16-10-47.
of

the

The second cause of

corporation

because

of the

Defendants refusal to acknowledge the Plaintiff as a stockholder,
pay dividends to Defendant and otherwise treat the Plaintiff as a
stockholder.

The

third cause

of action was that the Defendants

had breached their fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff because they
had

paid

themselves

dividends

maliciously and intentionally in
of action

and

salaries

that regard.

and

had

acted

The fourth cause

was for deriviative claims of the corporation alleging

that the individual Defendants had

breached

their

duty

to the

corporation by using corporate funds, assets and credit to assist
them personally.

Defendants

appeared

and

denied

all

of the

allegations of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
Trial by

jury commenced

on October 24, 1984, Judge Richard

11
C. Davidson

presiding.

It

should

be noted that the court had

already determined that Plaintiff was a
issues

were

limited

to

Complaint relating to
Plaintiff as

the

damages

a result

claims
to

the

stockholder so
set

the jury

forth in the Amended

corporation

and

to the

of Defendants conduct of the corporation,

given the fact the Plaintiff was shown to be a

stockholder. The

trial lasted four days, concluding on October 27, 1984.
The

jury

was

given

numerous instructions.

eight

special

interrogatories

and

The interrogatories and the answers given

by the jury are as follows:
1.

Do you find that any of the Defendants have refused to
allow Plaintiff, his agents or attorneys, to examine
the books of A-l Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc.?
Yes.

2.

Do you find that part of the payment made to the
individual Defendants were dividends or gifts? Yes.
If yes, how much in total? $1,000,000 (in total to all
shareholders).

3.

Do you find that the corporate assets have been
misapplied or wasted? No.

4.

Do you find that the acts of the directors or those in
control of the corporation are illegal or oppressive?
Yes.

5.

Do you find that A-l Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc.,
loaned corporate moneys to the individual Defendants
without authorization from its shareholders to purchase
the Richens property? Yes. If the answer is yes, has
A-l the corporation been damaged, and if so, how
much? $81,556.

6.

Do you find that the persons controlling A-l Tank
Rental & Brine Service, Inc., have paid themselves
unreasonable compensation?
No. If yes, how much in
total? $0

7.

Do you find that the individual
violated their
fiduciary duty to
thereby benefiting themselves at the

Defendants have
the corporation
expenses of the

12
corporation? Yes,
8.

If yes, in what total amount? $0_

Do you find Plaintiff's legal action has conferred a
benefit on the corporation? Yes. (Unable to determine
monetary value.)

Trial Record at 848-850.
The jury

was duly

filed by Defendants to
form

of

837-847.

the

instructed and
the

form

of

verdict. Trial

numerous objections were
the

Transcript

These objections included the

questions as

to the

instructions
at

failure to

individual Defendants.

and the
819-835,

divide the

Trial Transcript at

832.
On

January

verdict entered

8,

1985,

the

court,

the

jury

judgment against the Defendant A-1 Tank Rental &

Brine Service, Inc. in the amount of
failure to

interpreting

produce records

$5,000.00 as

a penalty for

pursuant to Plaintiff's letter dated

June 30, 1983. The court reserved for further hearing the amount
of attorneys

fees to

be awarded to the Plaintiff as well as the

remedies it would impose based upon Jury Verdict Answer.
Attorney for the Plaintiff entered a Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements dated
487.

February 27,

1985. Trial Record at 485 and

Defendants moved to strike the bill

of costs

as not being

in accordance with the costs as determined pursuant to Utah law.
Pursuant

to

court

order,

an evidentiary hearing was held

with respect to attorneys fees on March 5, 1985. After
and evidence

with respect

the Plaintiff 68% of
Transcript

of

March

to attorneys

the attorneys
5,

1985

at

argument

fees, the court awarded

fees and
36-37.

costs testifed to.

The court based this

13
percentage on

the fact

that the Plaintiff received judgments of

25,000 as a statutory penalty for failure to allow examination of
records,

$13,958.86

as

his

paid other stockholders.
attorney

time

stockholder.

portion of dividends which were be

The

achieved

in

The court

court

disregarded

any

value or

proving that Plaintiff was indeed a

then

determined

68% by mathematically

dividing sum of $18,958.86 awarded to the Plaintiff by $81,556.00
awarded to
the

jury

the corporation.
found

that

This $81,556.00

the

loaned themselves money of

judgment is where

individual Defendants had improperly
the corporation

to purchase property

for a new site for the corporation.

$81,556.00 was a judgment of

the corporation

individual

against

the

four

Defendants. The

court in determining the amount of attorneys fees simply took the
ratio

between

the

$13,958.86

plus

the

$5,000.00

and

the

$81,556.00.
The court

did not

substantial amount
stockholder

and

consider the

of his
also

fact that Plaintiff used a

attorney time

obtaining

the

proving that
remedy

of

he was a

causing

the

corporation to buy him out as a minority stockholder for
$50,000.00.

The court did

not consider

nor require Plaintiff's

counsel to allocate its time between the various causes of action
when it was serving the benefits of the
purportedly

benefiting

of

the

Plaintiff as

corporate Defendant.

opposed to
There was

no request nor any effort whatsoever to allocate time between the
various causes

of action

despite Plaintiff's demand, therefore,

the court simply granted its relief on this mathematical basis.
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Thereafter,

in

determining

based on the fact that the
improperly

as

a

relief

Defendants had

stockholder,

corporation be sold to
were the

what

the

the highest

would be ordered

treated the Plaintiff

court

bidder.

ordered
The

that

the

highest bidder

Defendants who purchased the corporation and thereafter

satisfied the corporate judgment against themselves.
Because the Defendants have purchased the
issue is

now resolved

corporation, that

and there is no issue on appeal involving

the derivative claims of the corporation, except as
fees therefore, >as all

parties acknowledge

that the Defendants

are now the sole stockholders of the corporation.
have chosen

for business

reasons not

The Defendants

to appeal a number of the

jury determinations based upon the Partial
consequence of

to attorneys

Summary Judgment. The

the Defendants selective appeal of this matter is

to allow the jury

verdict to

stand in

significant part

if the

Partial Summary Judgment is not reversed by this Court. However,
in

addition

to

Defendants have
to examine
Judgment

appealing

Partial

Summary

Judgment, the

also appealed the award of $5,000.00 for refusal

records,
of

the

Contempt

the

awarding

leading

to

of
a

attorneys

fees

Judgment in the amount of

$874.10.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

and the

A DISTRICT COURT CANNOT RESCIND ITS DENIAL OF
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND THEN GRANT
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THROUGH A DIFFERENT
JUDGE.
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The court erred in allowing a reconsideration of the
motion

for

Partial

additional facts

Summary

or legal

Judgment, where

there

arguments advanced. There

were

no

is no such

thing as Motion for Reconsideration.
II.

THE FACTS AND LAW DO NOT JUSTIFY PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DETERMINING PLAINTIFF TO BE A STOCKHOLDER.

The court erred in catagorizing
stock

forfeiture.

The

the

arrangement

issue

was

as

simply

one

of the

a stockholder

buy-sell agreement and/or condition to obtaining the stock.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT OF $5,000 FOR
REFUSAL TO ALLOW ACCESS TO CORPORATE RECORDS.
There

is

simply

no

evidence

access to corporate records.
improper

as

there

is

no

allow examination on site.
explains both

The form of Plaintiff's request was
duty to provide records, but only to

The intervening

the Plaintiff

effort to examine records

that the Defendants refused

interlocutory appeal

and Defendants

in connection

failure to make any

with the

June 30, 1983

request.
IV.

THE COURT
CONTEMPT.

ERRED

IN

FINDING

THE DEFENDANTS TO BE IN

The court erred in finding Defendants to be
it

was

proceeding

itself

improperly

by failure to docket the

judgment and allow a Supercedeas Bond hearing.
court in

its order

in contempt for

The switch by the

and then the prompt compliance by Defendants

negates any contempt.
V.

THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AND IN THE METHOD USED
TO DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES.

The court erred in allowing

derivative

claims

based

on a

16
complete

failure

to

follow

the

calculation of amount ignored
Plaintiff

and

itself

was

prerequisites.

the other

The monetary

relief obtained

irregular.

by the

The Plaintiff's attorney

should have been required at minimum to segregate their time.
ARGUMENT
I.

A

DISTRICT COURT CANNOT RESCIND ITS DENIAL OF PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND THEN
GRANT PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT THROUGH A DIFFERENT JUDGE.
careful

Davidson's

review

of

Memorandum

the

Trial

Record

Decision

dated

May

prior

26,

to

Judge

1983, clearly

reveals that Plaintiff was granted a Motion to Reconsider.
On July 23, 1982, the Plaintiff
Summary Judgment. Trial

Record at

Memorandums supporting
October

14,

and

1982, Judge

in

at 184

and Appendix

to Brief.

63.

filed

Summary

Motion for Partial

The parties filed their

opposition

Ballif

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial

filed a

to

the

Motion.

On

a minute entry denying

Judgment.

Trial Record

Copies of the minute entry were

sent to attorneys for the parties.

The minute entry requested no

order be filed nor is it required that a formal order be prepared
when a Motion for
after Judge

Summary

Trial

Plaintiff's
been referred

Plaintiff's

Record at

Motion

to

denied.

the case,

Motion

80. Judge

Reconsider.
requested that

Motion to Reconsider, which
December 6,

is

Thirteen days

Ballif' s minute entry was filed, the Plaintiff filed

a Motion to Reconsider
Judgment.

Judgment

request was

1982. Trial Record

at 89.

for

Partial Summary

Ballif took no action on
Judge

Davidson,

having

Judge Ballif decide the
made in
In

a letter dated

the letter to Judge
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Ballif of

December 6, 1982, Judge Davidson specifically requests

that Judge Ballif "make a
latest motion

ruling

of course

on

the

latest

motion".

was the Motion to Reconsider.

The

Then, on

January 4, 1983, some 2 1/2 months after Judge Ballif in a minute
entry

Plaintiff1s

denied

Motion

Ballif, apparently at the
ruling

which

rescinded

for

request of
his

Partial Summary Judgment of

Summary

Judgment, Judge

Judge Davidson,

denial

of

entered a

Plaintiff's Motion for

October 14, 1982. Trial

Record at

85 and Appendix to Brief.
Although

Judge

Ballif,

in

his ruling of January 4, 1983,

recognizes that a Motion for Reconsideration is inappropriate, he
in

essence

does

reconsider

denying the

Motion for

appeared to

justify his

and

rescind

Partial Summary
action by

his earlier decision

Judgment.

stating in

Judge Ballif

that ruling that

"The court deems it appropriate to avoid the limit
ations such a ruling will place on the court hearing
the matter on its merits and therefore elects to
rescind the ruling of the court dated October
14, 1982. . . ".
Trial Record at 85.
Clearly, a

denial of a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment would

create no limitations
matter.

Nevertheless,

on

a

second

some seven

Judge

evidence,

and

Motion for

Partial Summary

Judgment.

Trial

After

Motion

Defendants

for

petitioned

Partial
for

hear the

additional Memorandum,

additional

the

or

would

months before, Judge Davidson

reconsidered the same Motion, without any
Affidavits,

who

Summary

consideration

granted

Record at 109-110.

Judgment
of

Plaintiff's

an

was granted,
interlocutory
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appeal to this court, which petition was denied.
It seems

clear that

name, is still

a

Motion

Plaintiff's Motion
1982.

When

Ballif

to

filed

ignored

that

Judge

Ballif1s

Davidson,

original

on

of

Motion

to

by any other
Ballif denied

on October 14,

Reconsider, Judge

Motion, upon the request of Judge
the

seven

denial

Judge

Summary Judgment

his

Davidson, Judge Ballif ruled
denial,

to Reconsider,

Reconsider.

for Partial

Plaintiff

rightly

a Motion

Motion

months

by

later

Plaintiff's

rescinding his
reversed

Motion

for

Judge
Partial

Summary Judgment*
In

Peay

v. Peay,

602

P.2d

recognized the problems created
and

a

decision.

party's

right

to

by

rely

841

(Utah, 1980) this court

Motions
on

the

for Reconsideration
finality

of a court

The Court said:

,f

...[T]he new rules of procedure . . . were designed to
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure which the
parties and the courts could file and rely upon
. . . in order to avoid such a state of indecision for
both the judge and
the
parties,
the practical
expediency demands that there be some finality to the
actions of the court; and he should not be in the
position of having the further duty of acting as a
court of review upon his own ruling." Id. at 843.
In the case at

Bar,

not

only

was

Judge

Ballif

acting

as a

court of review upon his own ruling, Judge Davidson also acted as
a court of review.
Although it may not
Civil

Procedure

for

a

be

inappropriate

party

to

refile

Summary Judgment, if such is done, it should
on further

evidence in

under

the

Rules of

a Motion for Partial
only be

done based

the form of Memorandum and Affidavits to
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support the

Motion.

In

clear that the actions
granting of

this case, the underlying facts make it

of the

lower court

Plaintiff's Motion

such Motion
Procedure

a reversal

have

clearly

Plaintiff's Motion

of the

to Reconsider.

to Reconsider

ruling which was the basis of

This Court

and

to the

for Partial Summary Judgment was

nothing short of a granting of
and ultimately

with respect

and the

Rules of Civil

consistently established that such

an action is erroneous and warrants reversal.
This case warrants reversal
the historical

reluctance to

Clearly,

if the

lower court's reversal and
were

to

be

heard

at

point especially given

grant Summary Judgment if there is

any doubt as to whether issues
decided.

on this

of

material

issues which
granting of

trial

on

the

fact

remain

were foreclosed

to be
by the

Partial Summary Judgment
merits, it would not be

prejudicial to the Plaintiff and would in fact favor the policies
of this

Court. The Defendants

regularity of

procedure and

are also entitled to a pattern of
to rely

upon some

finality to the

actions of courts*
II.

THE FACTS AND LAW DO NOT JUSTIFY PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DETERMINING PLAINTIFF TO BE A STOCKHOLDER.

The substantive basis of this appeal relates to
granting of

the Motion

the court's

for Partial Summary Judgment determining

Plaintiff to be a stockholder.

Defendants

have previously noted

the manner in which that Partial Summary Judgment was granted and
noted

the

error

inherent

therein.

However,

involves the substance of the court's ruling.

this

argument
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In order

to evaluate

whether Partial

Summary Judgment was

proper, it is imperative to evaluate what evidence was before the
court at

the time the Motion was granted.

evidence was

presented

the

later trial

which involved the relationship between the parties.

However, it

would be improper
collateral

to

to

the

to

use

the

court

A significant body of

that

other

information

issues

charged with fully addressing

during

and

as

neither

the earlier

it

was merely

party

could be

issue which

had been

decided.
The court had on file the unsworn Complaint of the Plaintiff
and the unsworn Answer of the Defendants which had attached to it
a copy

of the

Bylaws.

Subsequent

to the Complaint and Answer,

Defendants answered a set of Plaintiff's
Answers were

signed by

These

Robert H. William, President of A-l Tank

Rental & Brine Service, Inc.
Answers to

Interrogatories.

Based

Interrogatories and

on

the

Complaint, Answer,

a copy of the Articles of Incor-

poration and Bylaws, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

Trial

Record at

57, et. seq.

This is the sum of the

evidence that was presented on behalf of the
for

a

ruling

in

its

favor.

Plaintiff in asking

The Defendants responded with an

Affidavit signed by Lloyd LaDell Slaugh and Mark McKee.
evidence was

properly before

of the allegations stated
improperly used

No other

the court and, of course, a number

in the

Complaint and

as they are unsworn.

none other, the court granted Partial

Answer would be

Based on this evidence and
Summary Judgment

of the Plaintiff determining him to be a stockholder.

in favor
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A careful reading of the court's Memorandum Decision and the
subsequent Order based thereon
found

that

neither

the

Articles

statutes allowed a forfeiture
Plaintiff had
to

note

indicates its

of

of

basis.

Incorporation

stock

and

based

to be and remained a stockholder.

that

in

determined and

reaching

this

indeed this

that what was involved

legal

is the

was

a

The court
nor

thereon the

It is important

conclusion,

whole center

forfeiture

of

Utah

the court

of its ruling,

Plaintiff's stock

ownership.
In

this

instance, the

categorizing

the

parties.

determining that

By

nature

of

individual's stock could be
obvious.

Stock

court
the

has determined the issue by
relationships

the issue

forfeited,

forfeiture

is

was one
the

disfavored

strongest wording would permit such a thing.
form are

disfavored by

the law

between

of whether an

ruling
and

then became

only

once had.

in any

The nature of a

forfeiture is that one loses an interest entirely; he
which he

the very

Forfeitures

and in equity.

the

loses that

The idea of forfeiting one's stock ownership

in a corporation is obviously going to be disfavored and once the
issue is tagged as being of that nature, the obvious occurs.
The Defendants bring this appeal because they believe it was
not a forfeiture, but

merely

an

agreement

between

the stock-

holders to buy out their respective stock interests under certain
circumstances.
parties, it

That is, it

was an

was

agreement of

buy-out agreement amongst

not

a

forfeiture

between the

sale, an option to purchase, a

stockholders.

Each

of

the minority
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stockholders, when

the corporation was formed, were employees of

Dalbo which was engaged
corporation was

in a

related oil

field business.

owned by Robert H. Williams and his family,

That
A-l

Tank Rental & Brine Service, Inc. was to be an allied corporation
which

would

complement

Dalbo.

Mr. Williams

as the owner of

Dalbo, decided to form the new corporation with his key employess
in

Dalbo.

case.

Those

individuals

It was agreed

that Bob

include

the

Williams and

Plaintiff

in this

his company, Dalbo,

would use their credit to buy the various equipment that would be
needed to get A-l Tank Rental
iDrine plant

as his

running and

indeed he

share of the original corporation.

understates his contribution because of his
of large

put up the
But that

continuing provision

amounts of credit for the fledgling corporation and his

ability to use
benefit it.

portions

of

the

Dalbo

yard

and

equipment to

Each of the minority stockholders put up a small sum

in cash, $11,870.00. The Plaintiff, as

one of

these employees,

put up that sum of money.
They

agreed

between

remain employed with Dalbo
relinquish his

themselves

that if any person didn't

for

years

stock ownership

for repayment of his

three

he

would

sell or

in the new corporation in return

entire contribution

plus interest

at 10%.

What this meant was that if Dan McKee or Mark McKee or any of the
minority stockholders were to leave the employment of Dalbo, they
would be

paid their

for their stock.

original contribution

It should be

noted that

plus interest at 10%
a person contributing

money to a corporation doesn't have that right to have that money
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returned except

under certain

conditions.

In this case, it was

agreed that there was this buy-out for each of them.
they left

Dalbo that

was what

had to

Williams had left, he would have
plus interest
it.

on its

value at

That is, if

be paid to them.

received back

If Bob

his brine plant,

10% from the time he contributed

It is obvious that it wouldn't be likely that he would leave

the employ

of Dalbo

because he was the owner, but nevertheless,

ne was an employee of that corporation.
the two

businesses were

were also working

for

related and

A-l

Tank

It should be
in working

Rental.

The

noted that

for Dalbo they
businesses were

intertwined.
What

is

occurring

is

got together and agreed that
the

new

corporation

go

that
all

Dalbo

provides

provides the tanks that
provides fluids

that do

of

through

which was interrelated in the
Rental.

a

hold

items that do not hold Dalbo

field
in

these

not go

them

would

work

to make

their relationship with Dalbo

oil

fluids

group of five stockholders

the

business

to

A-l Tank

tank business and A-l

fluids.

Admittedly, Dalbo

in A-l tanks and A-l Tank rents

fluids, but

the

majority

of the

business of the two companies was and is interrelated.
Each stockholder is assured that if he leaves the employment
of Dalbo that he won1t be
but will
10%.

left as

a mere

minority stockholder,

be paid the amount of his contribution plus interest at

There is no prohibition

making such

an agreement.

or

restriction

on

a stockholder

Indeed, these kinds of agreements are

logical in a close corporation.

A

buy-out

agreement

of this

24
nature

is

common

in

small corporations and close corporations

and indeed is looked on with great favor by people advising small
corporations.
The error of the court was categorizing this relationship as
being a forfeiture.

It isn1t a

forfeiture if

one receives back

his original contribution plus interest at 10%. That is simply a
buy-out of his stockholder
If

employment

arrangement.
arrangement

ceases

The

ownership conditioned

the

evidence

was. and

agreed

stockholder
is

that

to

it

agrees

Plaintiff
when

on employment.
to
knew

the buy-out
what this

he entered into this

corporation.
The treatises note and discuss similar arrangements:
Generally, the provision of a Bylaw, the Articles of
Incorporation, or the stock certificate requiring a stockholder before selling his stock to afford the corporation or
other stockholders an opportunity to purchase it, sometimes
referred to as a first refusal option, or a buy-sell
agreement, is valid and binding upon the stockholder, either
as a regulation within the powers of the corporation or as
a
contract
obligation
voluntarily undertaken by the
stockholder, provided that the Bylaw is reasonable and does
not conflict with the statute. Indeed, such an option is
the most popular and frequent restriction on the transfer of
shares, because it is considered the most servicable and
fairest type of restraint and also because of its universal
acceptance as to its legal validity.
18 AmJur 2d, Section 690 at 566-567.
In this case, not only was the buy-out agreement between the
stockholders an oral agreement, it was also a

clear provision in

the written Bylaws of the corporation.
It has

been noted

that the other stockholders who remained

with the corporation also received

a

return

of

their contrib-
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ution.
the

While

specific

Indeed,

that

may

Duy-out

the

be

the

case,

arrangement

Defendants

have

it

says nothing about

involving

received

the

various

Plaintiff.

dividends

and

significant other returns beyond that that which was given to the
Plaintiff.

This

is simply

a result

of their

staying with the

corporation.
The critical issue
holed11 as

is

a forfeiture

whether

this

agreement

is "pigeon

or as a stockholder agreement enabling a

buy-sell between the parties.

It

is

the

Defendants1 position

that the document is clearly a buy-sell agreement and had nothing
to do with

forfeiture

whatsoever.

where

loses

interest

one

However, in

his

this

case,

the

Forfeiture

is

a situation

and receives nothing in return.

only

things

which

the Plaintiff

contributed to the corporation was his payment to the corporation
in the form of

an initial

the corporation
ment was

Plaintiff received

agreements

noted that

the

three

(3) year

period, that

it was

the Plaintiff

and not the

elected to terminate Plaintiff's employment. A

the most
based

within

back his original contribution with interest.

It should also be

review of

his employment with

to enable it to be a success. When that employ-

terminated

Defendants which

contribution and

common form

on

the

books set

up numerous buy-sell

condition of employment. See i.e., 6A

AmJur Legal Ford 2d, Corporations, Section 74:1997-2004. Therein
there are numerous form agreements providing for a disposition of
shares

upon

the

termination

of

employment.

The

parties

anticipated one of them might terminate his employment during the

26
critical

initial

period

required

for

this

corporation.

The

provision is reasonable, fair and appropriate.
In recognition of this
during the

three year

Williams nor any

of

agreement the

period.
the

stock was

not issued

None of the parties, neither Bob

minority

stockholders

received their

stock certificates until after the three year period was up.
of them recognized that the

employment

period

was

All

a condition

prerequisite to receiving the stock certificate pursuant to their
stockholder agreement.
possession of

The

fact

the certificate

that

Plaintiff

not have

is evidence of the fact that each

acknowledged the stockholder agreement.
any evidence

did

The record

is devoid of

that the Plaintiff ever requested the stock certif-

icate during the three years, indeed he did not request the stock
certificate for

almost three years after he left the corporation

and only on or about
This

was

after

contribution
Plaintiff's

the

the

plus
part

time

Plaintiff

interest.
is

this
had

litigation
received

Clearly,

inconsistent

with

this
his

was commenced.
back

all of his

behaviour

on the

allegations

and

entirely consistent: with the position of the Defendants.
It should be noted that this argument does not rely on facts
yet to

be adduced.

However, there are facts which could assist

in the determination regarding the nature of this clause, whether
it be

a forfeiture

clause or

a stockholder buy-sell agreement.

That is beyond this Court at this point but taken as a
Motion for

Partial Summary

whole the

Judgment should have been denied and

once denied should not have been changed.
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It

should

stockholders

be

agreement,

Incorporation and

it

that

if

an oral

there

evidence

need

not

agreement between
of

tangible

are

be

dealing

in

the

there is

the presence

with

a

Articles of

In fact, it can

the parties, especially if

performance

supports the evidentiary allegation
this case

we

it need not be in the Bylaws.

simply be
is

noted

of

an

of a

and reliance that

oral

agreement.

In

written document setting

forth the terms of the arrangement and oral testimony saying that
it was

agreed to although unsigned, supported by non-delivery of

stock certificates in aid thereof.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT OF $5,000 FOR
REFUSAL TO ALLOW ACCESS TO CORPORATE RECORDS.
On May

26, 1983,

granting Partial
determining
Record at

the court

Summary

that

the

Judgment

Plaintiff

109-110, 130-131.

been placed
letter to

in Order

on

June

Appendix to Brief.

in

was

favor

form, the

the Plaintiff
See Trial

Memorandum Decision had

attorneys for Plaintiff wrote a

the attorney

30, 1983.

of

a stockholder.

After the

John C. Beaslin,

Defendants

rendered a Memorandum Decision

Trial

of record representing
Record

at

150-151 and

The June 30, 1983 letter requests that within

fifteen (15) days, that the books, records of accounts, minutes,
and other
copying

corporate
by

Mr. McKee

refers to Utah Code
therein.

On

records
and

be

provided

for

examination and

his accountant. Id.

The letter also

Section 16-10-47

July 13,

Interlocutory Appeal.

1983 the

and refers

Defendants filed

The interlocutory

appeal

to the penalty
a Request for
on

the Partial
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Summary Judgment was denied on August 2, 1983.
A year and a half later the court in rendering a judgment of
the jury verdict determined that it
the

penalty

set

forth

in

Section

Motions prior to the date the
De a stockholder.

1983.

improper to impose

16-10-47 to any letters or

court determined

the Plaintiff to

The only request subsequent to the court order

determining the Plaintiff to be a
June 30,

would be

For

stockholder was

this reason,

would award a judgment

based on

the court

the failure

the letter of

determined that it
to respond

to the

letter of June 30, 1983 of $5,000.00.
A

number

trial court

of

issues

determination.

should

be noted with respect to this

Initially,

the jury

was not

properly instructed

was

failure

to

dated

the
on

June

provide

30, 1983.

it should

be noted that

that the relevant refusal

records

pursuant

to

the letter

It would be impossible to determine

whether the juryfs determination that there had been a refusal to
provide access

to corporate

records was

based on

the June 30,

1983 letter or one of the many other instances that the Plaintiff
alleged he

was denied

access to

that the trial court

is basing

the records. Thus, it appears

its entry

of the

judgment on a

jury determination which may not be based on the same incident at
all.

This was duly noted in the various

objections to

the jury

verdict form and in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss this portion of
Plaintiff's Complaint.
counsel specifically

See Trial Record at 837-838. Defendants1

noted in its motion that there needed to be

an intent to deny a person access and

that could

only be proved
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arter

the

Partial

Summary

Judgment

was granted and after the

Supreme Court had denied an interlocutory appeal. Id.
The initial issue is whether
a

jury

a

number

of

a

trial

having given

instances on which they could determine a

failure to produce records, then subsequent
trie jury

court

decision eliminate

to the

rendering of

all but a single incident and enter

judgment based on that incident.
Another issue is whether the framers of the statute intended
ir ro

be applied

in a

situation such

as this,

where there is

Irrigation between the parties with respect to whether
individual even

is a

stockholder.

between the parties over
stockholder.

whether

or

stockholder.

appeals

It

proper reading
rs rhat

would

of the

it would

enrolled as

Clearly, there was a dispute

or

a

over
be

$5,000.00

the

Plaintiff

was a

while

there is

the

Defendants1

suggestion

that a

statute and the intent behind the statute

only apply

a stockholder

the

penalty

whether the individual is indeed a

to a

and has

situation where

Plaintiff's

counsel

a person is

a stock certificate.

t-isrant matter, the Plaintiff did not
Clearly,

not

Under these circumstances, it is not appropriate to

cnarge the Defendant with
Irrigation

or not an

have a

could

In the

stock certificate.

have proceeded with a

Eacuest for Production under the normal rules of discovery rather
tran through

the letter

format.

It is the Defendants' position

rhar the statute is not applicable to the
ally

when

the

very

issue

of

the

incident here, especi-

existence of a stockholder

relationship is on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
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Another issue

which is

involved in

June 30, 1983, is whether there was a
the statute.

denial as

neither Plaintiff

nor his

June 30, 1983, letter*

attorneys nor

agent appeared at the offices of
or

to

copy

them

or

that letter

That is,

his accountant nor any

the corporation

to examine the

to proceed in any way with them.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that

there was

in response to

any refusal by mail or orally of a right to come and

examine the records. The record simply
the letter

contemplated by

There is no evidence in the record whatsoever that

there was any response to the

records

the specific letter of

by the

Defendants.

reflects no

Furthermore,

response to

that the Plaintiff

did not appear for an examination.
A careful reading of the letter indicates that it is unclear
as

to

exactly

what

the Plaintiff's attorney intended.

Did he

intend that the books, records of accounts, minutes and corporate
records would

be given

to him at his law office, at the home of

the Plaintiff, or that they would
letter is

a suggestion

the

of

bulk

stockholder

its

or

that a

corporate

to

the

be examined

records

and

stockholder's

statute contemplates

deliver

them

to

attorney,

that

would

case,

there

is

a situation

records

on

site.

where the stockthe records.

In

no evidence whatsoever that the Plaintiff

came to the corporate office or attempted in
the

a

statute contemplates.

holder comes to the corporate office to examine
this

If the

corporation is obligated to take

certainly be beyond the bounds of what the
Clearly, the

on site?

There

any way

to examine

is absolutely no evidence in the
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record

anywhere

that

there

was

any

refusal

records*

There was no evidence in

the

trial

document

anywhere

that

indicates

any

to

provide the

and

there

is no

response or activity by

either party subsequent to the letter•
Of course, viewed in

the factual

relationship between the

parties, it

is obvious why there is no further effort to examine

the records

on

Interlocutory

site.

Appeal

The
with

fifteen (15) day period.
waiting

to

see

what

Defendants

the

a

Petition for

Supreme Court during this

As a result of this, both

the

parties were

ruling of the Supreme Court was with

respect to the Petition

for

factual

neither

circumstance,

Utah

filed

Interlocutory
party

Appeal.

pushed

examination of the records, nor was there any

Given this

either

for

the

refusal to provide

them.
Under

all

these

facts

with

respect

to

incident, the Defendant does not believe there are
findings to

justify an

this

specific

the necessary

award of $5,000.00 against the corporate

Defendant for a refusal to allow Plaintiff to make an examination
of corporate records.
IV.

THE COURT
CONTEMPT.

On April
Defendants to

ERRED

12, 1284
be in

IN

FINDING

the court

THE DEFENDANTS TO BE IN

entered an

Order finding the

contempt and awarding the sum of $694.00 as

and for attorneys fees and costs as a result thereof.
The only issue relevant to the
that amount

awarded as

contempt order

attorneys fees.

on appeal is

The issues involved in
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the Order

finding Defendants in contempt were that the court had

ordered the Defendants to
Plaintiff representing
Judgment•
with

deliver

his shares

The Defendants and

that

Order

a

for

two

stock

based on

their

by Utah

that the

Rule of

Order requiring
docketed

as

resisted complying

reasons. Both of these reasons were
the hearing.

The reasons

court had not entered its Order as required

Civil Procedure
delivery of

a . Judgment

Defendants1 position

to the

the Partial Summary

counsel

presented to the court at the time of
were first

certificate

Rule 58A(b)(c).

the stock
against

was that

That is, the

certificate had not been

the

corporation

and

the

they did not have to comply until

it was docketed.
The second reason is related to the first in that Defendants
did not

wish to deliver the stock certificate until such time as

they had an

appellate

Judgment was correct.

determination

for

interlocutory

Court, the same having been denied.
that they had the right to file a
the stock

the

Partial Summary

It should be noted that the Defendants had

previously filed a petition

delivery of

that

appeal

to this

The Defendants1 position was

Supercedeas Bond

and withhold

certificate until such time as they could

obtain an appeal from the final judgment which

would include the

ruling involving the Partial Summary Judgment entitling Plaintiff
to the stock certificate.
The trial court's position was that it had entered an Order,
that the
Order and

Defendants knew of the Order and were bound to obey the
that a

hearing regarding

a Supercedeas

Bond was not
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applicable to

its Order that the stock certificate be delivered.

The issue presented was simply whether or not
a right

to post

the Order of
delivery of

a Supercedeas

the

trial

the Defendants had

Bond and withhold performance of

court

pending

appellate

review.

The

the stock certificate makes resolution of that issue

moot, except as to the money damages for contempt.
Were the Defendants to have delivered
to

the

Plaintiff,

the

Plaintiff

encumber or otherwise transfer
icate, thereby

placing it

had a

legal right

certificate and post a
comply with

and deal

It

is

parties when the court

free to alienate,

with the

to withhold

stock certif-

unilaterally

indicating an

Defendants1 position
delivery of the stock

and thereby effectually

The issue was resolved between the
after

intent to

jail, indicated that it would receive
hold it

be

the

Supercedeas Bond

the court order.

objections and

would

out of reach of the Defendants should

they later prevail on appeal.
that they

the stock certificate

hearing

all

of the

place the Defendants in

the stock

certificate and

at the court until final resolution of the matter. This

is the reason why the
certificate as

Defendants

ordered by

that the court indicated

had

not

delivered

the court previously.

a disposition

to hold

the stock

Given the fact
the certificate

until final resolution of this matter, the Defendants immediately
delivered the stock certificate to the court. The reason why the
Defendants resisted

became moot when the court indicated that it

would agree to hold

the stock

finally resolved.

certificate until

the matter was
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Nevertheless,

the

court

contempt for failure to
that the

still

comply with

court itself

held

the

Defendants

its Order.

in

Given the fact

changed its own Order recognizing that it

had improperly put the Defendants in

a position

them to

post a Supercedeas Bond, it

obtain appellate

was improper
court.

It

to

hold

was not

review or

the

Defendants

a refusal

way.

for

contempt of

to comply with the court's Order,

but a refusal of the court to deal
and reasonable

liable

of not allowing

with the

Parenthetically,

matter in

a proper

it ought to be noted that

the trial court at a later date actually failed to follow its own
ruling and

gave the

stock certificate to the Defendant upon the

conclusion of the jury
the matter

would be

trial in

appealed.

allow the Defendants, their
the

actual

stock

agreement to do so.
the opportunity

this matter,

That is, the trial court did not

appellate

certificate

before delivering

Defendants again requested

a Supercedeas Bond prior to delivery of

the stock certificate, but
to hear any such request.

review

to the Plaintiff despite its own

At that time the

to file

knowing full well

the court

indicated an unwillingness

See Trial Transcript at 858-862.

V.

THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING AND IN THE METHOD
USED TO DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES

The

trial

$15,000.00

court

against

attorneys fees.
had prevailed

entered

the

The basis
in its

a

individual
of the

Judgment

in

Defendants
award was

derivative action

the

of

for Plaintiff's

that the Plaintiff

on behalf

oration against these individual Defendants.

amount

of the corp-
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Initially, the
noted.

There

including the
There were

nature of

were

only

the four

action should be

stockholders of the corporation

on the

Partial Summary Judgment.

individual Defendants
the only

who for

a period of

stockholders. Thereafter,

the trial court determined that the Plaintiff was also a

stockholder.

All

Plaintiff was

There is

anyone

other

represented.
seek to

were

suing the

ation.

no

occasion

than

this

litigation.

The

himself

for

the

because

Plaintiff

the

corporation pay

to represent

others

his legal

are all being
an attorney to

fees for obtaining

The only relief which

the Plaintiff

by filing as a derivative action that he could not get

individually was
ioefore trial
to assert

in

However, a derivative action allows

have the

could get

involved

other four stockholders and the corpor-

relief for the corporation.

against

five

Plaintiff based

time regarded themselves as
in 1983

this derivative

payment of

in this

four

fees.

Thus, shortly

matter the Plaintiff amended his Complaint

a derivative
the

his attorneys

cause of

individual

action for * the corporation as

Defendants

and

remaining stock-

nolders.
It

should

be

noted

that

prior

to

the

filing

of this

derivative action there was no demand made on the corporation for
any redress of any specific act as against
Indeed, the

statutory prerequisite that there be a demand on the

corporation that it take
insiders prior
the least.

the four individuals.

certain action

to protect

itself from

to filing a derivative action was not followed in

This would have

put the

individuals on

notice and
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the corporation

on notice

that if

some action isn't taken that

the other individual stockholder will bring
of the

corporation.

an action

on behalf

This notice provides an opportunity for the

corporation to effectuate its relief and avoid the implementation
of a derivative cause of action.
any form make this
derivative action

demand.

The Plaintiff wholly failed

This

makes the

questionable.

in various motions

to

the

Defendant

trial

whole basis

in

of the

duly noted this flaw

court.

Trial

Transcript at

842-846.
The derivative

action is also questionable because there is

no class which is purported to
The

Plaintiff

simply

be represented

represents

himself.

by the Plaintiff.
Any relief that he

obtains on behalf of the corporation will inure
of

the

four

Defendants

and

the

benefit

to the detriment

of

the

individual

Plaintiff who makes the derivative claim.
The

substance

individual

of

Defendants

themselves in

the
had

derivative

depleted

their private

action

was

that

the

the corporation to benefit

business ventures.

That claim was

joased principally on the fact that the individuals had engaged in
a real estate transaction using
from the

corporation.

The

rrial that what occurred
relocate it

name

which

they

had borrowed

facts indicated and it was proven at
that

the

corporation

desired to

offices in a different location. Trial Transcript at

The original contract
the

was

funds

of

the

to

purchase

corporation.

that time believed that

they were

the

ground

was

made in

However, the individuals who at
the only

stockholders of the
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corporation, consulted

with their

accountant.

Their accountant

advised them that for tax reasons it would be preferable for them
to buy it as individuals and lease it to the corporation.
Transcript at 712-715.
Plaintiff had

It should be noted that at this point the

ceased to

be an

employee of the corporation, had

been paid back his investment in the corporation and had
claim that
on the

he was a stockholder.

belief

that

Trial

they

were

made no

The Defendants were proceeding
the

only

stockholders

in the

company.
Based

on

their

accountant's

borrowed the money from
buy the

land, paying

the money borrowed.
The

derivative

alleging that

advice, the four individuals

the corporation
the corporation

and used

that money to

a modest interest rate on

Trial Transcript at 712-715.
action

was

based

upon

this transaction,

the Defendants had violated the applicable corpor-

ate law by borrowing corporate funds without proper approval from
all

of

the

stockholders.

Obviously, the Defendants were in a

position of thinking all of the stockholders had approved because
indeed they

thought they were all of the stockholders.

The fact

that in mid-1983 it was determined that the Plaintiff is indeed a
stockholder, then

makes that transaction improper ex post facto.

This question was submitted
counsels objections
statute.
Defendants

that it

to the

jury again

was indicative

over Defendants1

of a violation of a

Nevertheless, the jury found that indeed the individual
had

borrowed

money

improperly from the corporation

because there had been no stockholder approval of the transaction
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and based

on that found that the corporation had been damaged in

the amount of $81,556.00• The amount
issue

on

appeal.

corporation in
However, it
which

Since

the

the

bidding

of that

individuals

format,

that

damage is

have

not on

purchased the

issue

is

now moot.

does become relevant because it becomes the basis on

there

can

benefited

the

there had

been a

be

an

argument

corporation.

The

benefit to

that
court

the

derivative action

in determining whether

the corporation

or not determined

that this $81,556.00 was of benefit to the corporation.
It

should *be noted

whether or not
corporation.

the

The

the

the jury was specifically asked

derivative

action

was

of

benefit

to the

jury's answer was yes and when it was asked to

determine the amount, the
determine

that

amount.

jury indicated
The

that it

was unable to

Defendants' position is that the

jury's indication that it was unable to determine the amount does
not leave

room for

the court to thereafter determine the amount

of benefit conferred upon the corporation
the

jury

had

felt

that

was

the

to be

$81,556.00. If

amount of the benefit, they

obviously could have determined that amount inasmuch as
the ones

that came

up with

that figure

fact that the jury was unable
benefit to

the corporation

that there was not

to

in the beginning.

determine

is indicative

sufficient evidence

they are

the

amount

The

of any

of a specific finding

on which

the jury could

find the amount of benefit to the corporation.
Given the
court to

jury's specific

determine the

finding, it

benefit to

is improper for the

the corporation.

Obviously,
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any benefit

in this

kind of

benefit comes from the
ation.

The

Plaintiff.

only

one

stockholders
whose

The rest of the

benefited from

case is
of

87.75%

position

owners

the derivative

entirely fortuitous. The
of

changes

of

the

is that of the

corporation haven't

action in any way.

benefit that can be assessed here

is the

the corpor-

The only real

benefit to

the Plain-

tiff.
It should be noted that a derivative action has been defined
as follows:
An action brought by a stockholder is derivative if the
gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation or to
the whole body of its stock or property and not injury to
the Plaintiff's individual interest as a stockholder.
19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations, Section 528 at page 63. It should be
noted a that a court will not entertain a derivative
it

plainly

itself

has

appears
been

that

resorted

all
to

remedies
in

suit unless

within the corporation

vain.

Indeed,

the general

treatises note that:
Before a stockholder may institute a derivative action, he
must make a demand upon the corporation to commence the
action, unless such demand would be futile. The rule, as
expressed or recognized in a number of cases, is that a
demand on the corporate directors, officers or management to
JDring suit and their wrongful refusal to do so is necessary
before a stockholder may maintain a suit in behalf of
the corporation, in the absence of circumstances excusing
such demand.
19

Am

Jur 2d,

cases, it has

Corporations,

been

noted

that

Section

540.

Indeed, in various

legal

fees

not

awarded

in a

derivative action where the real beneficiary of the action is not
the corporation, but the stockholder and

where the stockholder's
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own

affairs

are

entertwined

with

the derivative action.

The

treatises note that:
Counsel fees will not
be allowed
a stockholder who
institutes suit against his corporation which is not for the
benefit of any stockholder except himself, especially where
the suit is to the disadvantage of other stockholders.
i9 Am

Jur 2d, Corporations,

Section 589

at 113.

See also 152

A.L.R. 920.
It is generally noted
attorneys

fees

that

that

should

in

be

derivative action, the general

determining

awarded

in

rules are

the
a

amount of

stockholder's

applicable.

The court

will consider what sums are reasonable depending on all the facts
and circumstances
and the

in a

standing of

litigation,

and

recoverable

as

Plaintiff

particular case.

the attorneys

the

amount

attorneys

stockholder

of

fees

has

The skill, experience

and the
recovery

is

not

expended,

difficulties of the
involved.

measured

but

is

by

limited

The

sum

what the
to

the

reasonable value of the services on behalf of the corporation.
Although

has

been

held

shareholder legal fees

with

respect

when

such

it

action

provides

a

that
to

case basis.

his

derivative action

benefit to the corporation, this

is a permissive power of the Court which
case by

it is proper to award a

should be

applied on a

In the present case, the jury specifically

found no corporate assets

had

been

misapplied

or

wasted.

In

addition, they were not able to determine a monetary sum by which
the

corporation

Combining

those

had

been

findings

derivative action was a

benefited
with

last

the

minute

by

Plaintiff's

fact
effort

actions.

that the Plaintiff's
which

failed to
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follow

specific

procedural

requirements

it

would be entirely

appropriate for the Court to award no attorney fees.
fees are

awarded, Plaintiff

is entitled

fees which specifically relate to the

If attorney

to only those attorney

derivative portion

of the

lawsuit.
This would

be in accordance with Rule 23.1 of Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure (1953) which
derivative

action

shareholder make

be

a

specifically

brought

specific

by

a

requires

that before

shareholder that the said

demand

on

the

directors

of the

corporation to correct those acts which the shareholder complains
of.
Plaintiff

claims

original complaint.

such

demands

However, a

were

made

in Plaintiff's

close reading of said complaint

reveals that there were no demands made on the Board of Directors
of the corporation in any manner let alone any request for action
with the
make

requisite

specific

specificity

allegations

directors of the corporation
little more

in

wrong
the

by

doing

the

statute. To

on the part of the

derivative

action

only a

than two months before trial is completely contrary

to the purpose of the
ignores the

of

required

rights of

requirements
the directors

in

the

statute

and wholly

of the corporation to take

the corrective measures they are entitled to make.
It is declared generally that before a stockholder
may institute a derivative action, he must make a
demand upon the corporation to commence the action,
unless such a demand would be futile. The rule, as
expressed or recognized in a number of cases, is that
a demand on the corporate directors, officers, or
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management to bring suit and their wrongful refusal
to do so is necessary before a stockholder may maintain
a suit in behalf of the corporation . . .
19 Am Jur 2d Corporations, Section 541 (Footnotes omitted).
There is

virtually no

evidence nor

any claim by Plaintiff

that any demand was made by anyone to correct or to bring suit on
behalf

of

refused.
such a

the

corporation

Nor is there

demand would

and that such demand was wrongfully

any evidence

be futile.

or claim

by Plaintiff that

The failure of the Plaintiff to

follow statutory procedures with respect to the derivative action
requires a

reversal of

of Plaintiff's

the award of attorneys fees.

amended

action

and

its

failure

The timing

to

allow the

corporate officers and directors to rectify the new complaints of
the Plaintiff justifies this ruling.
In addition,
erroneous, is

the

mathematical

which

itself was

an improper way to calculate the eimount of attorn-

eys fees.

See

to require

an allocation

Statement

Plaintiff as opposed
sense.

division

Further

to

the

of

Case,

infra.

The

court failed

at time between that used to serve the
the

failure

corporate
at

party

Plaintiff's

in

a derivative

counsel

to keep

adequate records for this purpose indicates a denial of attorneys
fees

would

be

proper.

mathematical model
counsel

in

550,000.00 of
into the
50/50.

proving

Furthermore,

to consider
Plaintiff

benefit thereby

the court failed in it's

the major
was

a

obtained.

effort of Plaintiff's

stockholder and the some
If

that were inserted

mathematical model, the benefits would be approximately
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The
legal

derivative

fees.

The

action

was

necessary

a last minute effort to obtain

prerequisites

were

not followed.

Lastly, the calculation of attorneys fees itself was flawed.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's

request relief

from this Court in the form

of a reversal of the Partial Summary Judgment
hereof.

The

consequence of

retrial on that single

on Issues

I or II

that reversal would be a remand for

issue; whether

or

not

Plaintiff

is a

stockholder.
If on

remand Plaintiff

were determined

holder, the other Issues III, IV

and V

not to be a stock-

herein would necessarily

be moot even were this Court to deny the appeal for other relief,
as requested in Issues III, IV and V

hereof as

a consequence of

Plaintiff not being a stockholder.
On the

other hand,

if on

remand the Plaintiff were deter-

mined to be a stockholder, then the results of the
not appealed

from would

r>id sale, etc.

In

be binding,

that event,

earlier trial

i.e.; the money judgments,

Issues III,

IV and

V would be

applicable.
Alternatively,

if

this

Partial Summary Judgment, it

Court

sustained the trial court's

will need

to reach

Issues III, IV

and V.
Defendants believes
appropriate.
Motions for

reversal on

The Court should
Reconsideration.

each of the five issues is

reaffirm its
The

firm policy against

trial court erred in categor-

izing the specific clause as a forfeiture rather

than a buy-sell

44
agreement.
Further, there

was no

denial of proper access to corporate

records in response to the June 30, 1983
did not

occur and

letter.

Civil contempt

lastly the imposition of derivative attorneys

fees was improper and not properly determined.
WHEREFORE, Defendants request reversal and remand.
DATED this 9th day of December, 1985.
DAINES & KANE

George Daines
Attorney for Defendant
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